RESPONSE
MUTUAL ASSENT VERSUS GRADUAL ASCENT: THE DEBATE
OVER THE RIGHT TO RETRACT
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR
I ended Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contract
1
Liability with a reminder that the analysis was “lacking in rigor and in
2
nuance” and that “[i]t remains for future work to explore the extent
to which the approach developed . . . has the horsepower to resolve
pragmatically the problems that have proven difficult for current doctrine and to examine whether these solutions advance the various so3
cial objectives associated with contract formation.”
Such “future work” arrived sooner than I expected. I have now
had the privilege to read the three commentaries that the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review solicited, three razor-sharp critiques, producing precisely what I hoped would follow: an exploration, balanced
with both theoretical nuance and empirical pragmatism, of the implications that flow from the no-retraction regime. And I may ultimately
have to concede that much is still unresolved (or at least not convincingly resolved) by the proposed regime. But before we reembrace the
traditional way of thinking about contracts, it may be worth our while
to take a moment to understand the scope and the validity of the critiques and to determine whether a fine-tuned account of the noretraction regime emerges with the aid of such understanding.
The commentaries to Contracts Without Consent occupy a continuum between the curious and the angry. On the one hand, it is
4
5
viewed charitably as an “intriguing” and “appealing new approach,”
6
embraced as a potential “new and promising beginning” of what can
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be called the law of negotiations (albeit a crude beginning). On the
other hand, it is rejected as “conceptually confusing, practically im7
8
possible, and instrumentally unwise” —an “ultimately disastrous” liability regime. My purpose here, in the brief final words that the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review have accorded me, is
not to quiet the many tones of disagreement, but rather, to amplify
them. I will try to use the commentators’ own claims to show where
the promise of my regime lies and to demonstrate how best to understand the weight of their critiques. Thus, in the next few paragraphs, I
do not intend to respond to every difficulty identified by my critics, to
show why they might be wrong (or perhaps right). Instead, I hope to
highlight the main themes that all of the comments share and to
briefly discuss what can be learned from these themes.
*

*

*

Many of the critiques of the no-retraction regime, when examined
in isolation, seem powerful. But often, the very strength of one critique is based on premises that suggest a weakness of, or even a response to, another critique. Unlike in litigation, where a good attorney argues in the alternative—where what matters is that each
argument has independent merit—here the mutual contradiction
may undermine the appeal of the critics’ bottom line.
Consider the following example. One major theme pursued by
large sections of the critiques is that the no-retraction regime is so inconsistent with current practices of contracting that it would lead to
9
“disastrous” outcomes or, at the very least, to ordinary opt-out. This
argument—let us call it the “disaster argument”—suggests that a noretraction liability regime is at odds with existing practices to such an
extent that it would cause people to change their negotiating practices
10
in a dramatic and costly fashion. At the same time, another line of
argument espoused by other sections of the critiques points out that
the no-retraction regime is not such a revolutionary departure from
current doctrine as it assigns liability in places where, by and large, it
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11

already exists. This argument—let us call it the “redundancy argument”—suggests that the legal consequences of the no-retraction regime are often so similar to those of the current mutual assent regime
that the difference between the two regimes is hardly detectable, and
therefore, little value exists in replacing the traditional foundations
with new, redundant ones.
While much can be said in support of each of these two critical
arguments, it is striking that the disaster argument and the redundancy argument cannot both be valid at the same time. If the noretraction regime, by creating liability without consent, “turn[s] con12
tract law upside down,” as Jason Johnston fears, how could it be that
parties are already regularly subject to liability so similar that “little
13
can be gained by adopting this new regime?” If indeed disastrous,
how could the no-retraction regime be “not substantially different
14
from . . . current law,” which, all commentators agree, already pro15
vides “enormously powerful” liability prior to consent?
More specifically, the critiques present the redundancy argument
in two forms. One version of this argument examines existing doctrine and claims that it already gives rise to many of the legal implications of the no-retraction regime. Daniel Markovits, for example, observes that liability already arises “out of the broader negotiation
16
relation,” and that, as the case of Drennan v. Star Paving Co.17 implies,
the law of contract has already “expressly welcomed” the principle
18
that liability emerges prior to consent. Similarly, Johnston claims
that in many important contexts in which there is no consent, promissory estoppel “has proven to be an enormously powerful tool for re19
covering damages.” Ronald Mann likewise notes that the difference
between the no-retraction regime and existing law is ambiguous and
that recovery is already provided for under current law “in circumstances that do not involve a bargain,” much the same as would occur
20
under the proposed regime. To the extent that the commentators
11
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are correct in their assessment of existing law, the disaster argument
appears somewhat overstated. While it might still be true that the
proposed foundations for existing practices are misguided, the redundancy argument suggests that these new foundations are not likely to
be so damaging.
The redundancy argument has another version, which compares
the implications of the no-retraction regime, not to existing law, but
instead, to existing negotiation practices. Highly methodical (as always) in pursuing this empirical perspective, Mann surveys actual contracting practices, particularly those utilized by parties entering complex agreements. He notes that the majority of negotiating parties
regularly assume precontractual liability burdens, such as irrevocable
offers, nonrefundable bonds and deposits, lockup fees, and other devices, all of which are intended to make retraction costly to themselves—in fact, no less costly than it would be under the no-retraction
21
regime. It is, of course, not clear that all transactors always desire
such burdens; however, the prevalence and the pattern with which
these private arrangements occur are, again, inconsistent with the
22
claim that these burdens are “impossible” or “unwise.” And Mann’s
account of the heightened prevalence of these private arrangements
in complex transactions is hard to reconcile with the claim that parties
to such transactions, who seek to acquire information throughout the
negotiations, are the ones most likely to be chilled by the very similar
liability burden of the no-retraction regime.
This contrast between the disaster and the redundancy arguments—between the claims that the no-retraction regime is dangerous and yet, at the same time, prevalent—is, of course, not a weakness
of the critiques, but rather, their very strength. The critiques recognize the value of generality while understanding its danger. The value
is in providing a unified understanding of, and a consistent structure
to, various already existing contracting practices. The no-retraction
regime was derived by induction, by inferring the hidden “formula”
that explains actual law and practice—that which cannot be explained
by the consensus-based assent theory. To be successful, this account
must exhibit the redundancy characteristic; that is, it must closely resemble actual law and practice. The danger, on the other hand, and
the need for caution is in the application of this formula beyond the
circumstances that gave rise to it.
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In this spirit of caution, Markovits criticizes the absence of “ade23
quate possibilities for exiting the negotiation relation.” Slow, stale
negotiations should be dissolved freely without the liability consequences that otherwise accompany a “betrayal” of the negotiations.
Indeed, there is a lot of merit to this concern, and more work surely
needs to be done in marking the precise boundaries of liability, both
in entry (by defining what constitutes a “serious” proposal) and in exit
(by distinguishing dissolutions from betrayal). Nevertheless, it is important to recall that under the no-retraction regime, unilateral exit
from the negotiation does not automatically trigger retraction liability.
In fact, the very same reasons that cause the negotiation to reach a
deadlock—the insurmountable gaps between the parties, the lack of
joint profitability, personal dislike, etc.—also suggest that it would be
highly unlikely that either party would exercise the option that the regime grants her, to concede the deal that is most favorable to the
other. And without such concession, no liability would arise. Thus,
the more legitimate the reasons to exit from the negotiation, the less
likely is dissolution to give rise to liability.
Another interesting inner tension in the critiques has to do with
the precontractual reliance problem. Here, too, the critiques develop
two themes that initially may seem difficult to reconcile. On the one
hand, it is argued that liability in the precontractual phase would lead
to excessive reliance and, hence, to excessive liability. This reading is
based on the premise that parties have many occasions to incur unsolicited unilateral costs and might do so if only to make it costlier for
24
their counterparts to break off negotiations. On the other hand, it is
asserted that “preconsensual investments seem unnecessary in many
25
cases” and that the only meaningful kind of precontractual investment is in information.26 According to this line of reasoning, the
“economists’” concern with precontractual reliance is artificial. Of
course, these claims—that there may be considerable opportunities to
invest preconsensually and that precontractual reliance is of minor
importance—do not have to be contradictory. Both claims may be
correct, albeit in different contexts. Thus, even if Johnston is correct
that Hoffman should not have relied on the negotiations with the Red
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27

Owl Stores chain (which I doubt), it is clear from Mann’s account of
complex negotiations that there are still many instances in which precontractual reliance expenses (including investments in information)
ought to be sunk.
The recognition that precontractual reliance is a potentially significant element of negotiations and that it should be protected and
encouraged is at the core of many doctrines that have expanded liabil28
ity to the precontractual stage, such as the Drennan decision, the
29
30
Tribune duties, section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and
31
sections 45 and 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Each
one of these developments was accompanied by counterconcerns
of excessive liability, i.e., fears that parties might be precluded from
terminating negotiations or be forced into transactions. The noretraction principle, reflecting what Markovits labels a “freestanding
32
morality of the negotiation relation,” surely warrants no less concern
and fear. But I am not sure that the type of inefficient “intermeddling” that worries some—namely, excessive investments aimed at increasing liability—is a significant problem under this regime. For
one, courts can usually distinguish between useful and wasteful reli33
ance. Moreover, there is no reason to think that any party would
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benefit from such excessive reliance. Recall: For the relying party to
impose liability on her counterpart, she must be willing to accept the
terms that the counterpart required, supplemented by pro-defendant
gap-fillers. Incurring high expenditures without a willingness to con34
cede such terms would not be a profitable strategy.
In the seams between disaster and redundancy, between overreliance and the disregarding of reliance altogether, the critiques identified areas in which the implications of no-retraction liability still need
to be finely worked out. This Response is surely not the place to conduct such rigorous inquiry. This is not the place, for instance, to address the concern raised by all the critiques that under the noretraction regime any public invitation to bid, any request for quotes,
could expose the solicitor to liability to each of the many respon35
dents. If it were the proper place, I would have continued in the direction I began to articulate in the Essay, developing a richer analysis
of when a decision to dissolve negotiations or to reject a bid is, and
when it is not, a retraction of previous invitations. Such analysis is
likely to succeed, I posited, if only because sensible bidders do not
normally view a solicitor’s non-acceptance of their bids as “retrac36
tion.” Their expectations, when submitting their offers, are more
modest, because the representations made to them are understood to
include more subtle conditions and no guarantees. Thus, for example, a contracts professor who submits a manuscript to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review does not normally view its non-acceptance as
“retraction,” even though the Law Review invites submissions (unless,
of course, the solicitation by the Law Review was made with an explicit
assurance of publication). Because contracts professors know perfectly well how to distinguish between rejections and retractions when
engaging in their private precontractual relations, there is every reason to expect that they will be able to enlist the same intuition and
make similar distinctions when designing the law of precontractual relations.
Likewise, this is not the place to address another concern prominent in the critiques, namely, that parties who enter negotiations with
or excessive reliance. If anything, it reinforces the view that excessive reliance is not
likely to occur.
34
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genuine uncertainty about the quality of the “match” should be able
to revise their positions in the course of negotiations as more information becomes available. Again, were it the proper place, I would have
inquired into the efficiency and fairness of the traditional rule, which
arbitrarily places all the risk of failed negotiations on the party who
made the precontractual investment. A priori, it is not clear to me
that, with the arrival of new information, the party who made a serious
proposal that induced the investment should be completely free to revise her proposal or walk away without sharing the cost. Surely, had
the negotiations succeeded, the retracting party would have benefited
from the investment. Why, then, should she not bear some of the
cost? More generally, it is certainly true that any redistribution of the
cost of failed negotiations could have significant effects on how contracts are negotiated and how parties are matched. It might also have
problematic effects on the cost and the ease with which negotiations
can be dissolved. But it is far from clear that an extreme “freedom
from contract” rule of no cost sharing and no liability prior to consent—of placing the loss where it arbitrarily lies—is the rule most
likely to promote negotiations. The prevalence of precontractual costsharing agreements suggests otherwise.
If this were the place to further defend my idea of ascending liability, I would have argued that some of the views of the critics in fact
support and complement, rather than weaken, the case for such
gradual ascent. Johnston, for example, advocates that “early stage”
statements should be viewed as “cheap talk,” whereas “late stage”
37
communications should give rise to liability. He suggests that the
primary factor that distinguishes “early” from “late” stages and that
gives rise to liability is the number of parties “on each side of the
38
transactional divide.” This number-of-recipients criterion is indeed a
very sensible yardstick for measuring the seriousness of the proposal;
however, like other measures of the intent to be bound, it too is a test
that fulfills gradually. Between the starting point of “many” and the
end point of “one,” the number of parties with whom there is a
chance to transact winnows down continuously throughout the negotiations. Thus, even under the Johnston yardstick for liability, there is
no clear reason why liability should not emerge in a gradual fashion
where the number of parties gradually diminishes.
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The doctrine of mutual assent is the primary remnant of the longstanding dedication of contract law to the idea of mutuality: Unless
both parties are equally bound, neither is bound. Many of the historical developments of contract law can be understood as absolving different aspects of mutuality. Thus, it was long ago thought that an
agreement to buy cannot be binding before payment, or else only the
39
seller would be bound, the buyer not having given anything. Until
more recently, it was thought that an agreement that grants one party
the power to determine the quantity is so one-sided that it could not
40
be binding. Likewise, it was considered a verity that a promise to
hold an offer open must be revocable, because as long as both parties
41
are not bound, neither can be bound. These, and many other corollaries of the mutuality tradition, have been reformed, replaced by a
jurisprudence more tolerant to one-sided contractual liability, more
adequately tailored to reflect the varying tones and occasions of the
parties’ commitments. The no-retraction regime is a platform that
tracks recent advances in this course of departure from mutuality and
charts a tentative direction where it may be headed.
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